Procyon LLC: From Music Recommendations to Preference Mapping by Chinn, Susan J.
  
Teaching Case 
Procyon LLC: From Music Recommendations to 
Preference Mapping 
 
 
Susan J. Chinn 
School of Business 
University of Southern Maine 
96 Falmouth Street, Portland, Maine 04103 
schinn@usm.maine.edu 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Procyon LLC had re-launched and renamed their music discovery site, Electra, to Capella, in 2008. Its core strength had 
originated from Electra’s proprietary technology, which used music libraries from real people, its members, to generating 
“automated word-of-mouth” recommendations, targeted advertising and editorial content. With the re-launch, Capella’s focus 
changed from a business-to-consumer destination site to a demonstration site for Procyon as it pursued a new business-to-
business strategy. What led Procyon to make this strategic change? What products and services should it market, and to 
whom? This case describes the transition from music recommendation to preference mapping, and provides students with a 
variety of alternative partnering options to consider as they move forward. 
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1. BACKGROUND 
 
1.1. Introduction 
In this case, a small entrepreneurial firm made a move from 
providing a music recommendation product, Electra, to re-
launching a new product, Capella, with a new purpose. 
Instead of focusing on end users in a saturated market, 
Procyon used its experiences with music discovery to find 
new partners and customers in the business-to-business 
(B2B) marketplace that would benefit from their 
personalized music recommendations, advertising and 
editorial content preference mapping technology. The 
business on which the case is based has been disguised to 
protect the source. 
The case is especially useful for graduate MBA and upper 
level MIS students studying e-commerce, Internet marketing, 
strategy, or entrepreneurship. In the MBA course, the case 
could be used to consider the overall strategy for an 
organization in a rapidly evolving e-commerce environment. 
In a strategy course, the notion of core competency becomes 
key as Procyon seeks to apply its technology to a different 
marketplace. For entrepreneurship, the case illustrates the 
need for small businesses to be nimble and adaptable. MIS 
students could explore how online music sites with 
recommendation features work, and which components can 
be used by business partners. E-commerce students would 
benefit from analyzing this type of Internet business as it 
moves from a business to consumer (B2C) orientation to 
B2B, and its struggle to find the right market segment and 
business partners. 
Learning Objectives 
As stated above, the case provides opportunities for 
discussion on various topics by both undergraduate and 
graduate students. The major objective is to determine the 
company’s core competencies, assess the different directions 
it could take with its shift in strategy, and make a case for 
pursuing new B2B choices with new business partners. Other 
learning objectives are: 
1) To discuss how a small technology company’s mission 
and strategy has evolved over time and why. 
2) To explore the nature of the online music marketplace and 
discuss industry directions. 
3) To discuss the concept of the “long tail” (Anderson, 2008) 
and the impact this has had on e-commerce. 
4) To discuss the impact of Web advertising and marketing, 
as well as other nontraditional method, such as the use of 
social media. 
5) To discuss critical success factors based on competitor 
analysis, and then to decide what Procyon’s critical success 
factors are. 
6) To examine different types of B2B partnering 
arrangements. 
7) To explore the phenomena of both the “local web” and 
geo-location, and the broad market opportunity associated 
with targeted advertising based on taste and psychographics 
as an extension of demographic targeting – first in music, 
and then potentially in other categories. 
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 2. THE CASE 
 
The following sections provide company background and 
evolution up to the re-launch of the new recommendation 
site, an analysis of music recommendation systems and the 
Internet marketplace. The case then describes the options 
Procyon faced in pursuing a B2B strategy. The ultimate 
decision is left for students to discuss. 
 
2.1. Company Background: Procyon LLC 
Procyon LLC was founded in 2004 as Procyon Music LLC 
by Laura Hewitt, Elizabeth Gray, Ray McCarthy, and Sergei 
Bodrow. Ray and Elizabeth had built software that could 
provide music recommendations, but lacked the business and 
music industry connections to market it. Laura and Sergei 
had the music industry connections as a result of work they 
had done together on a music festival, and Sergei had 
received ten Grammy Award nominations; in addition, 
Laura’s experience at a leading computer software 
organization followed by a successful entrepreneurial 
venture in the mobile phone industry gave the group the 
necessary know-how and impetus to move forward. The 
original vision for the company focused on combining the 
music recommendation software and the management team’s 
connections in the music industry to provide a launch pad for 
music discovery, especially for “indie” artists that needed 
more exposure. In 2005 Procyon launched a desktop 
application for music discovery called Electra. The original 
technology behind Electra generated music 
recommendations by comparing a user’s own iTunes 
libraries and listening behavior with other listeners’ song 
collections and listening behaviors. At the time, providing a 
means for new artists to be discovered by linking them to 
other artists based on users’ listening preferences was 
unique. 
 During the first few years, Procyon received several seed 
grants from the North Coast Technology Institute. These 
grants were used to improve user navigation and usability 
testing for the application, develop the infrastructure and 
features needed to help the business generate revenue, extend 
the technology to make video and movie recommendations, 
and create programs to attract music industry partners. In 
2008, the application, which had been cumbersome to 
download and use, was completely redesigned and re-
launched as Capella, a Web-based service that by this time 
had accumulated a database of over ten million tracks. 
 
2.2 Procyon’s Management Team 
The CEO of Procyon, Laura Hewitt created Procyon in 2004 
and provided the leadership for the organization. Her view 
was that “People are the path to music and the best way to 
find new music is through others who share a similar 
passion.” Elizabeth Gray became the CTO of Procyon. 
Elizabeth’s work in collaborative filtering was a real 
breakthrough -- she deployed her work in an early venture 
that was one of the first community-based automated 
recommendation systems. The technology she invented 
became the foundation for the music discovery algorithms 
used on Electra and Capella. Chief Engineer and co-founder 
Ray McCarthy’s background included software development 
at large technology firms. Truong Nguyen, Creative 
Director, brought to Procyon his skills as a Web and typeface 
designer, exhibit curator, and musician. Sergei Botow, VP of 
Music Industry Relations, pioneered the idea of using the 
Electra technology to target free, promotional MP3s to the 
right audience. Electra Free Music (EFM) served as both a 
marketing strategy for Electra.com and as a promotional 
vehicle for the labels and artists who submitted the MP3s. 
Rounding out the team was Stan Norton, in charge of 
networks and eventually, web hosting. 
Steven Aronson became Procyon’s President and COO in 
2008, assuming responsibility for developing and executing 
business and technology strategies to enable Procyon to 
pursue business-to-business opportunities to generate 
revenue in scale, and create new exit strategies. Previously 
he had been responsible for launching, growing and 
managing five new businesses and executive initiatives in 
emerging markets. Steve soon hired Mark Pettinger, who had 
also worked on start-up market opportunities as a short-term 
advisor to assist with branding and business-to-business 
marketing strategies. Steve subsequently hired Sanjit Patel as 
VP of Sales and Marketing to lead business-to-business sales 
and marketing efforts on a full-time basis. Sanjit had spent 
more than 15 years selling and marketing high-tech products 
and ideas. For an organization chart, see Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Organization Chart 
 
2.3 Electra  
Procyon’s principal product had been a music 
recommendation system called Electra. The recommendation 
system was initially based on comparing, analyzing and 
sharing iTunes playlists among its members (i.e., the users of 
its 20 MB desktop application). In addition to the drawback 
of requiring users to download a 20 MB application and an 
install process that could often involve a 20 minute wait 
while it scanned a hard disk looking for music, the software 
suffered from a cumbersome look and feel. In contrast, 
established competitors Pandora and Last.fm only required 
users to go to their site and register, and then they could 
simply type in an artist and press play. Electra was harder to 
figure out because of the decisions that needed to be made 
regarding a number of features. In addition, Electra content 
was limited to EFM full length MP3s and 30 second samples 
of all other recommended music since the company elected 
not to incur the significant expense of licensing music, or 
play full tracks without a license and deal with the legal 
consequences later.  
 In order to grow its user base for Electra, Procyon 
implemented in the spring of 2008 a partnership with a Web-
based company called Spica. Spica offered music services to 
over a million college students via subscription. Procyon’s 
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 patent-pending technology enabled Spica to use their users’ 
individual music profiles to provide personalized music 
discovery opportunities and specific song recommendations, 
editorial and promotional content, and connections to users 
with similar musical taste to each Spica user. In return, Spica  
promoted the Electra brand on their music player, and 
provided direct links to the Electra website from the “My 
Spica” section of its website.  
 
3. MUSIC DISCOVERY SYSTEMS 
 
3.1 Characteristics of the Marketplace 
Music recommendation and discovery systems had been 
noted as one of the top ten Internet trends of the first decade 
of the 21st century (McManus, 2009). Music, as with other 
forms of media, such as movies and books, had become a 
commodity that required little storage space in digital form. 
As user tastes had become increasingly fragmented and 
specialized, marketers recognized the potential of the “long 
tail” (Anderson, 2008). Blockbuster titles might have many 
sales at the head of the tail, but there were also many more 
titles in a huge inventory of products that sold in very small 
amounts, but that, in the aggregate, could be just as 
profitable. According to Tim Westergren, Pandora Radio’s 
founder, 70% of music is “obscure,” and people had a hard 
time both finding it in the first place and then buying it 
(Starr, 2006). Recommendation systems could bring that 
music to potential consumers’ attention.  
 Combined with music volume in the long tail was the 
increased delivery of purchased music as individual songs in 
digital format instead of CDs. Forrester research predicted 
that by 2012 music downloads would outpace CD sales, and 
forecasted an average growth rate of 23 percent in digital 
sales, generating $4.8 billion in revenue (Harris, 2008). In 
November 2008, Atlantic Records posted more sales of MP3 
files than CDs for the first time (England, 2008). The 
category killer was iTunes, Apple’s popular digital music 
store. Although profit margins were slimmer for individual 
tracks than for CDs, increasing sales, as well as Apple’s own 
payment methods to reduce transaction fees, had started to 
disprove the contention that iTunes only “broke even” 
(Marsal, 2007). In addition, the characteristics of modern 
technology had made Internet radio services such as Pandora 
popular, as more users upgraded to personal computers with 
pre-installed, media-ready hardware, software and broadband 
Internet access. 
 A variety of distribution models for music had been 
launched, ranging from e-commerce downloads to mobile 
computing. E-commerce download sites, as exemplified by 
iTunes, offered song downloads with various pricing 
strategies. Music streaming on demand was another 
distribution model, usually involving a subscription fee. 
Some of the free sites offered restricted downloads supported 
by ads. Other distribution models included search engine 
approaches, where users could search the Internet for sites 
streaming particular songs; social networking sites, offering 
streaming and free downloads (e.g., MySpace Music); 
mobile bundling, offering music over handheld devices; 
video games offering music downloads; and artist direct 
distribution, where artists could stream and sell music 
directly to fans (Redwood Capital, 2010). Over time, 
distinctions among many of these models had begun to blur, 
typical of any industry trend where rapid technological 
breakthroughs result in multiple products and services until a 
shakeout occurs (e.g., the “dot-com” boom), and consumer 
preferences solidify. 
 Most music recommendation and discovery systems had 
similar features in common. These included using an 
analyzer to scan existing playlists, providing users with 
controls to accept or reject recommendations, and creating 
online playlists that could be shared. Some of these systems 
supplied widgets or other mini-applications that could be 
integrated easily with social networking sites or deployed on 
a mobile device. Additional services included promotions for 
related concerts, new releases, blogs or discussion forums, 
access to other members’ playlists, and tools for emerging 
artists to submit music. Finally, listeners were often directed 
to a commercial site such as iTunes or Amazon to buy songs 
they liked. 
 
3.2 Industry Directions 
The music discovery and recommendation industry seemed 
to be combining various business models with others 
(notably music streaming), and the industry was far from 
stable, but overall the direction in 2008-2009 appeared to be 
three-fold. First, there was already movement in the area of 
mobile applications. Pandora, for example, became available 
as an application on the iPhone in 2008. The application 
allowed the user to listen to 100 stations, rate songs, and 
make purchases through iTunes. Researchers were also 
studying mobile devices as vehicles for viral and word of 
mouth marketing. A challenge with mobile applications was 
making them run on any type of handset and operating 
system (Conrad, 2008). This challenge led to the second 
issue, the establishment of cross-platform communities for 
video, music, movies, games, and other media, so that there 
was a common interface and a consistent set of services. 
Pandora, Last.fm, and others were working on making music 
streaming applications work in this consistent way (Sandin, 
2009). The third notable direction was international 
expansion. In 2006, Pandora, for example, was developing a 
world “music genome” and was actively partnering with 
more international labels; however, licensing issues and 
subsequent litigation had stymied these initiatives, and, in 
the case of Pandora, had limited membership to U.S. 
residents only. 
 
3.3 How They Work  
Recommendation systems were first introduced in the mid-
1990s and gained traction with the success of e-commerce, 
which had provided access to a vast quantity of available 
goods and services, as well as a large set of consumers who 
left evidence of their online behavior (e.g., cookies, 
clickstream metrics, actual sales conversions, etc.). These 
systems had their roots in both information retrieval and 
artificial intelligence. Several approaches to providing 
recommendations and aiding discovery had been used. Some 
systems were completely algorithm-based and employed 
some variant of k-nearest neighbor, while others worked on 
the concept of collaborative filtering, based on users’ 
behaviors and profiles. Some systems were completely 
machine-based, while others relied on human experts. In 
addition, some degree of data mining software was required 
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 to sift through the data, looking for new, unexpected 
connections. 
 Some of the algorithms used in recommendation systems 
were reminiscent of work in case-based reasoning. One of 
the best known set of methods and the simplest form of 
machine learning was called k-nearest neighbor, which 
looked for a certain number (k) of listeners who liked the 
same songs, and then used other songs that each person in 
the network had listened to as the basis for providing new 
recommendations. Latent factor algorithms, though less 
efficient than k-nearest neighbor, looked at patterns of 
consumer preferences. Both of these methods could be 
applied to domains other than music, because they could 
examine consumer preferences independent of the subject 
domain (e.g., music, movies, books, etc.). These methods 
tended to fall short if there was limited data (e.g., a 
completely new music genre) or tastes changed frequently. 
Mufin was an example of an Internet music site using 
algorithms to provide correlations based on song similarity 
and music attributes; listeners searched for music based on 
musical attributes such as tempo and mood (Lardinois, 
2009). Mufin Player Pro also provided a visual k-nearest 
neighbor map of user playlists based on sound attributes.  
 Collaborative filtering was a very widely used mechanism 
for music recommendations, and often but not always 
employed k-nearest neighbor algorithms. This method was 
based on the concept of “the wisdom of crowds” 
(Surowiecki, 2004), which posited that a large number of 
independently-minded people in a community were more 
accurate in their decision making or problem solving than a 
group of experts. In the case of music, sites monitored 
listening behavior from their user communities. What 
strengthened the recommendations in addition to the 
community’s consensus was the additional use of user 
profiling. The profiling came from user likes and dislikes, 
voting, and other comments. Last.fm was a well-known 
example of a music site using collaborative filtering. It used 
a technique called “audioscrobbling” to add information 
about songs from a user’s computer or MP3 player to the 
user’s profile on its site. Last.fm reported over 30 million 
active users; the site was bought by CBS in 2008. Along 
with Pandora, it was consistently listed among top music 
discovery sites (“What It’s Really Like Inside Last.fm,” 
2009). 
 Classification systems, the most notable being the Music 
Genome Project powering Pandora, used expert analysis of 
music attributes. The Music Genome project started in 2000 
with 30 experts in music theory analyzing music from over 
10,000 artists over a five-year period. The analysis was 
based on attributes such as tone, rhythm, beat, or vocals. 
When listening to a recommended song, users could ask why 
a song was selected and the music analysis was displayed. 
Users could then vote to play more songs like the one in 
question, or request never to hear it again. According to Tim 
Westergren, Pandora’s founder, collaborative filtering could 
never be as successful for music discovery because filtering 
was based on popularity, and popular listening focused on 
major hits; therefore the user was not introduced to new 
music as much (Starr, 2006). 
 In addition to algorithmic methods, collaborative filtering, 
or human-based classification systems, music sites employed 
different hybrid methods based on combinations of 
recommendation strategies. Last.fm, for example, allowed 
listeners to recommend music to each other directly in 
addition to collaborative filtering; MOG allowed artists to 
share their digital music libraries with fans (Bruno, 2006); 
iLike, a site using a social networking approach, allowed 
users to share and recommend songs, although it too scanned 
music libraries on the users’ computers to make additional 
recommendations. Two/thirds of iLike users accessed the 
service directly from Facebook (Mortimer, 2008).  
 
4. INTERNET MARKETING STRATEGIES 
 
4.1 Personalization and other Forms of Revenue 
Generation 
In general, music discovery sites generated revenue through 
targeted advertising. Banner ads or in-stream ads were often 
used. The user was forced to view the ad if it was positioned 
in-stream or, in the case of Pandora, the ad was shown in 
order for the user to continue to listening. Rather than 
showing generic advertising, however, more companies 
began to consider using cookies and clickstream metrics to 
track user behavior and preferences to deliver personalized 
advertising via dynamic Web pages. Clickstream data was 
particularly valuable, because it could reveal information 
such as what items customers might have looked at but did 
not purchase, what items were purchased with other items, 
which advertisements generated a lot of hits but few sales, as 
well as the order in which pages on the site were viewed and 
other browsing behavior. 
 Web personalization was seen as much more important on 
music sites compared to regular e-commerce sites because 
users tended to spend a lot of time on a few pages and thus 
had a higher engagement level, an effect often referred to as 
“stickiness.” Traditional metrics such as cost per impression, 
therefore, did not capture this deeper relationship. Targeted 
advertising that offered the listener something of value (e.g., 
a screen skin) was seen as essential to building and nurturing 
that relationship (Morrissey, Harding, and Bruno, 2009). 
Web personalization helped to reduce the feeling of 
information overload and also provided access to the long 
tail. Beginning in 2004, ChoiceStream, a recommendation 
service provider, had conducted an annual survey on 
personalization to U.S. adult Internet users. Several of the 
key findings from the 2008 survey covered personalized 
Web advertising. Frequent shoppers (58%), as well as 50% 
of the biggest spenders, were more likely to click on 
personalized ads. Most respondents (79%) also 
acknowledged the impact of advertising’s influence and 
brand advertising on their consumption habits; they also 
understood that Web purchase behavior was collected to 
determine how to target ads. Seventy-eight percent of 
consumers were interested in receiving personalized content, 
particularly for “cultural goods” (e.g., music (40%), books 
(32%), and DVDs (29%)). They also saw the value of 
personalization in improving their experiences on social 
networking sites. However, poor quality recommendations 
were noted, such as inappropriate recommendations or 
recommendations unrelated to their online shopping 
(ChoiceStream, Inc., 2008).  
 Affiliate sales were also used to generate revenue. For 
example, an iTunes affiliate would be allowed to use Apple’s 
marketing material in emails, web sites, and Internet 
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 promotions. The affiliate could also link to the iTunes store, 
as well as to content and applications for an Apple device, 
such as the iPod. Commissions were earned from links to 
iTunes from the affiliate’s site (iTunes, 2011). If a user 
bought a song through an affiliate’s link to iTunes, the site 
would receive part of the royalty. 
 Music sites often also featured subscription services to 
provide the user with additional benefits including a lack of 
advertising, unlimited listening, and preference on the server 
(Pack, 2008). The real challenge, according to Felix Miller, 
founder of Last.fm, was getting the customer to the site. 
After that, he said, “we invariably have a user for life” 
(“What It’s Really Like Inside Last.fm,” 2009, p. 55). For 
traditional marketers, social network sites offered more 
opportunities to offer promotions, such as coupons or free 
music downloads. In addition to tracking more traditional 
Web metrics, marketers could use search capabilities, found 
on sites like Twitter, to find keywords of interest and could 
even trace that down to who initiated, participated, or 
followed the tweets. 
 
4.2 Viral Marketing, Word of Mouth, and Web 2.0 
Viral marketing, also known as network, buzz marketing, or 
word of mouth (WOM) referred to any strategy that used 
individuals to pass on a marketing message, thereby 
increasing its reach. Principles in a successful viral 
marketing strategy included giving away valuable free goods 
and services, making the transfer of them easy between 
individuals, using motivation (e.g., getting something now), 
planning for scalability if the promotion took off, leveraging 
existing networked communities, and using others’ 
resources, such as affiliate programs (Wilson, 2005). 
Although the marketing message originated with the 
company, its effect could be exponential since individuals 
that were excited about the product or service increased the 
buzz by promoting it on their own without compensation. 
 For cultural goods such as books, movies, and music, 
WOM was a powerful promotional vehicle. It could be 
especially effective for media items that received limited 
promotion, as opposed to blockbusters which were 
extensively advertised prior to their release. WOM had been 
shown to be very effective in extending the lifetime value of 
the customer. For niche items in particular, interest tended to 
spread more slowly due to limited access or exposure; 
interest also was more likely to spread by word of mouth 
(Higham, 2005). WOM thus became a customer-driven way 
of mining the long tail. The Internet served as an efficient, 
low-cost delivery vehicle for WOM “seeded” campaigns. 
WOM delivered a way to circumvent the continual erosion 
of positive consumer attitudes toward traditional marketing 
communication strategies. Finally, customers could generate 
excitement through positive WOM, which would increase 
the likelihood that they would return to a site. WOM was 
particularly well suited for social networking sites. In social 
networks, WOM was generated through invitations to join, 
requests to follow others, becoming fans of members or 
businesses, as well as specific recommendations. Consumers 
would be more likely to modify their purchasing behavior, 
based upon the effect of this “third party” relationship. It 
could be especially critical if a consumer had no previous 
experience with the product or service and used WOM to 
make decisions. 
 Music discovery sites had been promoted on social 
networking sites. Twitter, which had a music player, was 
also being used for music streaming. Applications like 
TwistenFM, a mashup of a music service Grooveshark and 
Twitter (Fitzpatrick, 2009), scanned tweets for mentions of 
songs, and added links to them to play through Twitter’s 
music player. Twitter’s open development platform made it 
easy to build applications using this service’s capabilities. 
Twitter had also been studied for its use as a WOM vehicle. 
Research found that 19% of tweets mentioned a brand; of 
those tweets, 20% contained opinions or emotions about 
brands (Bruno, 2009).  
 
5. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR PROCYON 
 
5.1 Music Discovery Re-launch 
Procyon’s B2C site was overhauled extensively, and was re-
launched and re-branded as Capella in November 2008. In 
addition to the new and improved features (see below), 
Capella’s purpose was redefined. Its primary focus was no 
longer a B2C destination site in what had become a more 
established market with big players with expensive music 
licensing agreements such as Last.fm and Pandora. Instead, it 
would primarily be used as a demonstration site and test bed 
for its recommendation and editorial and advertising 
preference mapping technology and new company initiatives 
using free music and video content from YouTube and 
Capella Free Music (CFM) – a free music catalog based on 
the free music supplied by Procyon partners (e.g., labels, 
digital marketers, associations, individual artists, etc.). 
 Capella was launched as a server-based recommendation 
and advertising and editorial content preference mapping 
service that included an optional iTunes “Helper” for users 
interested in a richer music discovery and recommendation 
experience based on their favorite music in their iTunes 
library. It also featured a more user-friendly interface with 
greatly improved content. Although the details of its 
technology were proprietary, in general the recommendation 
and preference mapping solution demonstrated on Capella 
was a collaborative filtering solution that used statistical 
techniques and data-mining methodologies to compare a 
user’s taste in music to other users across the community to 
make automated “word-of-mouth” recommendations from 
the community to each user (or from users to each other). 
The solution’s tiered approach enabled recommendations to 
be provided even if only one artist was provided to start the 
recommendations process – actively (e.g., typing an artist’s 
name into a search box) or passively (e.g., by browsing an 
artist’s page). More precise recommendations could be 
provided initially if the user chose to download the optional 
iTunes Helper. In either case, the solution was focused on 
providing efficient, precise and broad-based 
recommendations that included “long-tail” discovery (i.e., 
discovering new music that includes less well-known artists 
that cater to specialized niches). The result of these 
advancements enabled the recommendations and targeting of 
advertising and editorial content to be more flexible, 
scalable, and easy to integrate with partners and customers 
via a web service operating through a standard API 
(application programming interface) Procyon created. In 
addition, the same technology could be applied to categories 
beyond music (e.g., books, music, video, travel, financial 
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 services, healthcare, etc.) with the right additional data 
sources. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Pandora Web Site Showing a Smart Playlist 
(Source: Pandora.com) 
 
 The user experience centered on making a “smart” playlist 
built around a taste profile (see Figure 2 for an example 
similar to Capella’s player). The profile was generated from 
voting on songs (liked/disliked), searches the user performed 
looking for particular artists or songs. Smart playlists could 
be enhanced by adding selected YouTube videos. Users 
could access their smart playlists from any computer, and 
non-registered users could easily find saved smart playlists 
(available from cookie information on the computer that they 
had used to create them). Smart playlists could be renamed 
and shared with others. It was also possible to copy other 
users’ smart playlists. Procyon also built a catalog of over 
10,000 songs from over 1,000 labels, digital marketers, 
associations, independent artists, etc., and allowed the user to 
listen to and download full-length tracks. Tracks could easily 
be added to or deleted from smart playlists, andvoting on 
tracks could enhance the recommendations. Tracks that were 
not free for download were identified and linked to YouTube 
videos; the user could link from Capella to purchase these 
songs from online music stores. 
 Once the site was tested and fine-tuned, Procyon promoted 
it to determine how to best sell their recommendation and 
taste-targeted advertising and editorial content capabilities to 
prospective partners and customers, and drive their business 
goals as well. Procyon established presences on Facebook, 
MySpace, and Twitter, which strengthened existing 
relationships with their listeners as well as attracting new 
listeners from current users’ social networks. Procyon also 
developed a widget (see Figure 3 for an example similar to 
Proycon’s widget). Using a widget was seen as a way to 
extend the promotional reach of business partners and 
customers using Procyon’s recommendation and advertising 
and editorial content preference mapping technology, as well 
as creating a data asset for other sites, such as social network 
sites, music blogs, and content partner sites.  
 Procyon recognized that Capella could be most valuable in 
the near-term as a demonstration site to test new services 
after time and money spent on technology and marketing the 
site resulted in only small increases in user acquisition. 
Music sites needed “deep pockets” to pay the licensing fees 
to record labels. Procyon needed to redefine itself as a 
company, in terms of its core competencies, and then find 
the products and services it could offer to a new market. The 
B2C market was already dominated by key players such as 
Pandora and Last.fm. The combination of licensing fees plus 
the effects of the recession led the management at Procyon to 
explore the B2B market in order to leverage Procyon’s core 
competencies and to optimize its revenue potential by 
entering partnerships with companies interested in 
recommendation systems and preference mapping. 
 During this period, Procyon had implemented a successful 
partnership with Spica, a college music Web site. Procyon 
had provided an API, which allowed business partners to 
integrate the technology into their websites without coding. 
This was a tremendous advantage because other software 
systems required adopters to write extensive program code to 
link their applications. Second, Procyon proved that they 
were able to scale efficiently – they were able to 
accommodate growth as the number of subscribers grew 
without a decrease in performance. Third, Proycon 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Pandora Sample Widget (Source: 
bgreco.net/gadgets/Pandora) 
 
was able to improve the user experience and correspondingly 
the site metrics (frequency, length of stay, page views, 
impressions) to improve the economics of the site (e.g., 
reducing churn of existing subscribers and making the site 
more engaging for attracting new subscribers). Although 
Spica became a victim of the recession, the partnership had 
served as proof of Procyon’s technology and business 
acumen. 
 
5.3 Identifying the B2B opportunities 
Based on their success with Spica, Procyon conducted an 
analysis to determine the key competitors in B2B preference 
mapping. Most of Procyon’s key competitors were privately 
held firms who did not publish marketing or financial 
information; they spanned different business categories such 
as consumer electronics, content management, software 
development, mobile applications, online media sales, and 
retail media sales. Procyon was not only interested in 
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 identifying the competitors, but in looking at various critical 
success factors such as:  
1. Type of recommendation/discovery technology. 
For example, what degree of personalization 
was offered? Were there interfaces to social 
networks, or extensions such as widgets? Was 
content management part of the package? Did 
the technology work across multiple platforms 
and devices? How scalable was the software? 
2. Pricing model used. For example, were there 
initial fees for software installation or setup? 
Were there ongoing licensing, service, or 
maintenance fees? Were there additional fees 
for customization? What revenue share would 
be received for transactions or ads? 
3. Company stability and maturity. How long had 
they been in business? What was the size and 
type of customer relationships? What types of 
website content, programs, or tools were 
available for their partners? Were they 
financially stable and positioned for growth? 
 In all, nine competitors were identified based on a 
weighted set of critical success factors. The top three 
standouts were Gracenote, Media Unbound, and Strands. 
Gracenote, a subsidiary of Sony, offered products and 
services including music recommendation, playlist 
generation, content management, and a technology for 
finding music through voice commands. Gracenote’s clients 
were primarily in the fields of software development 
(notably iTunes), portable and mobile applications, 
automotive systems, and home entertainment 
(http://www.gracenote.com/). Media Unbound’s offerings 
included customizable playlists, including video playlists, 
recommendations tailored to specific regions, and a tool that 
could match users’ playlists based on how much a user could 
“gain” from a match with another user. Media Unbounds’ 
clients included eMusic (similar to iTunes), Viacom, and 
Napster (http://www.mediaunbound.com/). Strands offered 
recommendation tools aimed at businesses to track customer 
tastes over time, and services to deliver related content based 
on customers’ (and their friends’) views, page clicks, and 
ratings. Configurable widgets were available for site, email 
and mobile applications. Strands also provided an e-
commerce merchandising interface to control when 
recommendations were shown, content filtering tools, and 
reporting and testing for social media creators. Their clients 
included General Mills, SkyMall, and BodyGlove 
(http://recommender.strands.com/home.php). 
 Next, Procyon identified potential business partners and 
customers: retail enterprises, widget creators, marketing 
services, music-focused sellers, and artists’ services. Retail 
enterprises, whether strictly web-based or bricks and clicks 
(e.g., CD Universe) were attractive markets for Procyon. 
These enterprises were interested in driving demand across a 
wide variety of shopping categories. Many retail web sites 
could benefit from improved recommendation technologies, 
owned large music catalogs, and drew lots of web traffic. 
There were additional opportunities to move into 
recommendations for other types of products. The large sizes 
of many retailers, however, could make them a “tough sell” 
to partner with a small company. They might have been 
developing their own in-house solutions, and they tended to 
rely less on third-party targeted ads. 
 Widget providers (e.g., Widgetbox) allowed users to 
create content, put it into a widget format, and then embed it 
on a website, blog or social media page. They provided a 
means for quick, viral, and highly scalable distribution. 
These companies offered an established distribution network, 
relationships with social media outlets, and a solutions track 
record, but many of them were in the early stages of 
development and could require different (individually 
tailored) partnership agreements. Many of these providers 
lacked music widgets, and could benefit from preference 
mapping technology as an enhancement.  
 Marketing services providers (e.g., 9seconds) as well as 
advertising networks (e.g., Google’s AdSense) offered 
potential partnership opportunities. Marketing services 
included search engine marketing and search optimization, 
pay-per-click management, affiliate marketing, email and 
direct marketing, as well as consulting services. This type of 
organization could be interested in taste-targeted advertising 
or interactive taste-oriented services. Advertising networks 
such as Google’s AdSense provided sponsored ads on client 
Web sites, and featured the ability to customize those ads. 
Ad network services would be looking for assistance in 
executing various functions such as recruiting advertisers, 
providing the technological infrastructure, serving the ads, 
and handling the collection of advertiser payments. 
 Music-focused sellers and artists’ services were also 
highlighted as potential partners, especially middle-tier 
enterprises, whose focus was driving ad revenue and/or 
transactions. Music focused sellers such as ArtistDirect 
offered multimedia content, music news, and music 
discussion forums. These sites tended to lack 
recommendation engines or even music catalogs, but would 
be more willing to partner with a smaller company than 
would big retail sites. They could benefit from a more 
refined, targeted approach instead of relying on third party 
ads. As with widget creators, many of these enterprises were 
not mature and had many different business models, so 
adopting a strategy would have to be custom designed for 
each prospect. Artists’ services (e.g., Nimbit.com) offered a 
variety of integrated tools to create, upload, share, distribute, 
and promote music, concert tickets and other promotional 
items. These services met the needs of growing numbers of 
“working class” artists – artists with day jobs and local 
followings trying to expand into larger markets and get 
national attention through relationships with iTunes, Amazon 
and other distributors. Was there an opportunity to target 
their output more precisely? 
 
5.4 Finding the Right Partners with the Right Services: 
Decision Time 
As Procyon evolved its recommendation and advertising and 
editorial content preference mapping technology, it was 
asked by prospective partners and customers to develop 
contest technology as a natural extension of their 
recommendation technology. They developed a turnkey 
solution for companies to develop their own playlists on 
which users could vote. The playlists were not limited to 
music, but could include album art, YouTube videos, or 
similar content. Companies needed to establish a broadcaster 
account with Procyon, which would enable them to create 
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 multiple contest categories and items, as well as creating 
their own voting player with custom colors, logo, and 
dimensions. The player could then be easily posted to a Web 
site or blog (see Figure 4 for an example of a music contest). 
In addition to seeking out big partners with a national 
footprint, Procyon realized that preference mapping efforts  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Music Contest Example (Source: eurovision.tv) 
 
could be deployed over the “local web” (Turoczy, 2009). 
The local web represented a convergence of social networks, 
locally focused offerings from sites such as Craigslist, the 
proliferation of customer reviews for local music, local 
Facebook and MySpace pages, and online local directories 
that were replacing traditional telephone yellow pages. 
Access to local content was being strengthened by increased 
use of mobile technologies, especially smart phones. In 
addition, geo-location, whereby advertising content could be 
served to consumers based on their location, was starting to 
be deployed using Twitter and mobile phone apps. If the 
content could be based on individual preferences plus 
location, this model could be a potential application for 
preference mapping. 
 Enormous potential was emerging for revenue generation 
in marketing new releases through brand and music 
alignment. The Music Marketing Forum of 2009 highlighted 
the beneficial relationships to be gained from brand-music 
associations, and presented five key objectives in these 
partnerships: exposure, markets, imaging, distribution, and 
revenue (MIDEM, 2009). Exposure had traditionally been 
the main objective, but as both artists and brands sought new 
markets, image or brand perception became more important. 
Therefore it was even more important to target brand 
promotions to users carefully. For example, 
recommendations in music to heavy metal enthusiasts could 
lead to product recommendations, but who were these 
listeners? Would the brand’s image appeal to this market 
segment?  
 Targeted recommendations could leverage the relationship 
between branding and music sponsorships. Sponsorship 
spending had increased 3.8 percent in 2009, up from $1.04 
billion in 2008, and corporations were increasingly focused 
on associating brands with individual artists in addition to 
music festivals (Waddell, 2009). For example, Jessica 
Simpson’s and Avril Lavigne’s relationship with the 
Proactive skin care product line created an opportunity to 
link those promotions on music sites for persons who like 
those artists. In addition, artists increasingly sought non-
traditional distribution channels for new releases. Releasing 
new music on a company’s Web site or retail establishment 
could strengthen the relationship with the brand, as well as 
providing additional metrics to fine-tune preference mapping 
initiatives. 
 Procyon needed to focus on identifying the products and 
services they could offer to the potential partners. The 
question was, what and to whom? There seemed to be many 
directions to pursue. What they brought to the table was a 
proprietary technology, along with taste-based content and 
connections to users. How should this filtering technology be 
deployed? One solution would be embedding it in widgets, 
which had already been successfully tested for the B2C user. 
What about emerging artists and labels? How could 
Procyon’s technology allow them to find supportive and 
profitable business relationships? Was the content 
management functionality worthwhile? Were the 
promotional tools that were developed, such as contests, 
something that could be of value to partners? How could 
preference mapping- be deployed both at the national and 
local levels? 
 Procyon also saw that their focus would have to shift from 
development to sales in order to land lucrative deals with 
business partners. The plan for using Capella as a 
demonstration site only diminished the need for a company 
with limited resources to maintain content on the site or 
develop new features. What would the implications be for 
the staff, including some of the creative team who had 
founded the company? Which partners were most likely to 
be receptive to a young, energetic enterprise? Would that be 
limited to the small to mid-size market, or a larger one? 
Should Procyon focus on cultural goods, or look to deploy its 
technologies in related areas? What could it offer to social 
media sites, or the local community? There seemed to be a 
lot of opportunities for evaluating and promoting content, 
and making it accessible to the right people. Procyon’s 
challenge was to make the most sustainable and profitable 
choices. 
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